






The	‘Received	View’:	Quantum	Particles	as	Non-Individuals	The	reaction	from	the	‘quantum	revolutionaries’	was	immediate:	Born	and	Heisenberg	declared	that	the	particles	could	no	longer	be	considered	to	be	distinct	individuals	(again,	see	French	and	Krause	2006,	p.	106)	and	Schrödinger	subsequently	wrote	that	”.	.	.	we	have	.	.	.	been	compelled	to	dismiss	the	idea	that	.	.	.	a	particle	is	an	individual	entity	which	retains	its	’sameness’	forever.	Quite	the	contrary,	we	are	now	obliged	to	assert	that	the	ultimate	constituents	of	matter	have	no	’sameness’	at	all”	(Schrödinger	1996,	p.121)2		 How	did	they	arrive	at	this	conclusion?	One	can	think	of	their	reasoning	as	a	form	of	modus	tollens:	Boltzmann	explicitly	took	as	one	of	the	premises	of	his	approach	the	claim	that	the	particles	–	gas	atoms	in	his	case	–	were	individuals	(French	and	Krause	2006,	Ch.	2)	and	on	that	basis	derived	the	classical	Maxwell-Boltzmann	statistics	as	sketched	above;	as	also	noted	above,	these	incorporated	the	counting	of	permutations	of	particles	between	states;	in	quantum	statistics,	whether	Bose-Einstein	or	Fermi-Dirac,	these	permutations	are	not	counted;	hence	the	particles	cannot	be	regarded	as	individuals.	One	can	also	think	in	terms	of	a	metaphysical	explanation:	just	as	the	explanation	for	counting	permutations	in	the	classical	case	is	that	the	particles	are	individuals,	so	that	for	not	counting	them	in	quantum	statistics	is	that	the	particles	are	not	individuals.			 This	became	the	established	or	‘received’	view	(once	again,	see	French	and	Krause	2006,	Ch.	3),	whether	due	to	the	status	of	its	advocates	or	the	apparently	straightforward	nature	of	the	above	reasoning.	However,	the	nature	of	this	non-individuality	remained	unclear.	At	best,	certain	metaphors	would	be	used:	Post,	in	his	radio	broadcast	that	was	one	of	the	very	few	discussions	of	the	topic	at	the	time	(the	transcript	of	which	was	published	as	Post	1963),	invited	the	listener	to	think	of	two	umbrellas	that,	however	apparently	indiscernible	they	might	be,	could	still	be	discerned	by	some	nick	or	scratch	and	then	insisted	that	quantum	particles	were	indiscernible	in	an	even	stronger	sense.	Hesse	offered	the	example	of	money	in	a	bank	account	(Hesse	1963),	for	which	we	can	say	there	are	£n,	say,	without	being	able	to	point	to	which	specific	£	in	the	bank’s	accounts	ours	correspond	to	(Teller	used	the	same	metaphor	many	years	later;	Teller	1995).3			 Such	metaphors	are	interesting,	not	least	because	they	suggest	that	by	virtue	of	not	being	regarded	as	individuals,	quantum	particles	should	also	not	be	regarded	as	objects,	at	least	not	in	the	sense	that	we	think	of	umbrellas	and	£	coins	as	objects.	This	indeed	was	the	conclusion	also	drawn	by	Cassirer	and	Eddington,	who,	also	noting	the	work	of	Born	and	Heisenberg	(Cassirer	1936,	p.	184;	Eddington	1936),	used	it	to	motivate	their	respective	forms	of	structuralism	(neo-Kantian	in	the	former	case,	‘subjective’	in	the	latter).	Again	reconstructing	and	thereby	reshaping	the	core	of	their	arguments,	we	can	characterise	it	simply																																																									2	There	is,	of	course,	an	issue	of	transtemporal	identity	here	as	well	but	I	shall	not	be	considering	that.	3	There	is	an	issue	here	regarding	the	delineation	of	the	category	‘object’.	Broadly	we	take	it	to	involve	a	certain	form	of	repeatability	and	a	spatio-temporal	profile,	broadly	understood.	(Thanks	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	this;	also	see	Quinton	1973).	
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(Brading	and	Skiles	2012).	However,	the	above	considerations	demonstrate	that	they	do	not	have	such	a	determinate	profile;	or	at	least,	not	one	that	is	naturalistically	grounded.			 How	might	the	realist	respond?	One	option	is	to	cut	the	argument	off	before	it	really	gets	going	by	insisting	that	belief	in	the	existence	of	electrons	does	not	involve	belief	in	them	as	objects,	or	indeed,	any	other	metaphysical	category	of	entity.	This	eschewal	of	a	metaphysical	informing	of	her	position	would	leave	the	realist	at	the	‘shallow’	end	of	the	metaphysical	range	(Magnus	2012)	and	indeed,	there	have	been	moves	recently	to	reconfigure	realism	in	almost	entirely	epistemic	terms	(Saatsi	2017a).	Thus	one	might	insist	that	all	we	should	say	is	that	electrons	are	whatever	science	says	they	are	–	particles,	fields,	end-points	of	strings	or	whatever	–	and	that	the	job	of	the	realist	is	just	to	situate	our	‘best’	(however	that	is	determined)	theories	within	an	appropriate	philosophical	framework	involving	relevant	notions	of	truth,	reference,	progress	and	so	on.		 However,	one	might	feel	that	there	is	more	to	the	job	than	this!	So,	one	might	follow	Chakravartty	in	demanding	that	the	realist	provide	a	‘clear	picture’	of	how	the	world	is	(Chakravartty	2007,	p.	26)	and,	further,	that	the	clarity	of	such	a	picture	will	be	dependent	on	the	extent	to	which	it	is	metaphysically	informed.	This	would	be	to	slide	down	the	spectrum	towards	‘deeper’	forms	of	realism	but	how	deep	one	goes	will,	again,	depend	on	how	much	metaphysics	one	feels	one	has	to	appeal	to	in	order	to	achieve	a	given	level	of	clarity	(see	French	2018).	So,	van	Fraasssen,	at	least,	would	presumably	insist	that	if	the	realist	is	going	to	present	a	picture	of	electrons,	say,	as	objects,	she	needs	to	make	that	picture	clear	by	specifying	whether	qua	objects	they	are	individuals	or	not.	But	that	she	cannot	do,	at	least	not	naturalistically	in	the	sense	of	appealing	to	the	relevant	physics.	Thus	the	underdetermination	impacts	any	realist	who	seeks	to	go	beyond	the	very	‘shallowest’	forms	of	the	position	towards	some	‘clear	picture’	informed	by	what	might	be	taken	to	be	the	basic	metaphysics	of	objecthood.6			 Such	considerations	also	help	blunt	the	effect	of	an	alternative	response	to	the	underdetermination,	which	is	to	throw	up	one’s	hands,	as	it	were,	and	declare	that	forms	of	metaphysical	underdetermination	are	ubiquitous,	so	the	realist	shouldn’t	worry	about	this	one	in	particular.			 Thus,	for	example,	consider	the	metaphysics	of	properties.	These	may	be	regarded	in	terms	of	universals	that	are	instantiated	in	particulars,	or	they	may	be	understood	as	particulars	themselves	–	as	tropes	say.	The	latter	view	also	trifurcates,	with	some	holding	that	tropes	are	abstract,	others	that	they	are	concrete	and	still	others	maintaining	that	they	are	both	abstract	and	concrete	(for	a	useful	overview	see	Maurin	2018)	Now	the	realist	believes	that	the	electron	‘has’	(again	in	some	metaphysical	sense)	properties	such	as	(rest)	mass,	charge	and	spin.	How	metaphysically	informed	should	her	realism	be	in	order	to	provide	a	clear	picture	of	such	properties?	Should	she	be	required	to	take	a	stance	in	the	debate	over	whether	tropes	are	abstract	or	concrete	or	both?	That	seems	excessive	and	unnecessary	in	order	to	present	a	clear	picture.	On	the																																																									6	Of	course,	one	might	cleave	to	a	notion	of	object	that	goes	beyond	this	‘basic	metaphysics’	but	if	such	a	notion	is	tied	to	a	particular	‘individuality	profile’	–	by	virtue	of	having	a	spatio-temporal	location,	say	–	it	will	be	subject	to	this	underdetermination.	Again	I	am	grateful	to	Claudio	Calosi	for	his	comments	here.	
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other	hand,	it	doesn’t	seem	so	extreme	to	press	the	realist	on	whether	she	takes	properties	to	be	tropes,	in	general,	or	universals.	Perhaps	some	will	insist	that	here	too	we	have	a	clear	enough	picture	without	such	metaphysical	detail.		 However,	it	can	be	argued	that	when	it	comes	to	electrons	as	objects,	we	surely	have	a	less	than	clear	picture	if	we	cannot	say	whether	they	should	be	regarded	as	individuals	or	non-individuals.	Here	we	seem	to	have	moved	back	up	the	spectrum	towards	the	shallow	end	and	if	we’re	not	to	end	up	holding	a	metaphysically	attenuated	form	of	realism,	we	should	be	able	to	say	something	on	this	issue.	Supporting	this	argument	is	the	point	that	the	provision	of	such	a	picture,	when	it	comes	to	objects	at	least,	will	involve	not	just	providing	an	appropriate	metaphysical	framework	but	also	a	logical	or	more	generally	formal	one.	And	in	this	case	the	latter	frameworks	are	entirely	different:	when	it	comes	to	electrons	regarded	as	individuals	we	can	avail	ourselves	of	standard	set	theory	and	classical	logic	(issues	related	to	quantum	mechanics	notwithstanding)	but	if	we	take	the	electrons	as	non-individuals	option,	we	should	shift	to	quasi-set	theory	and	Schrödinger	logic.	Certainly,	as	indicated	above,	prior	to	these	formal	developments,	that	option	could	only	be	articulated	in	terms	of	a	metaphorical	picture	but	now	a	degree	of	clarity	has	been	achieved.	The	problem	is,	of	course,	that	we	can’t	take	that	particular	clear	picture	to	be	how	the	world	is,	given	the	underdetermination.			 There	is	more	to	say	here	of	course,	not	least	because	this	idea	of	providing	a	‘clear	picture’	may	not	itself	be	clear.	How	does	informing	one’s	realism	with	metaphysics	provide	a	measure	of	clarity,	for	example?	One	possible	answer	is	to	suggest	that	it	does	so	by	relating	the	‘picture’	we	are	concerned	with,	in	quantum	physics	in	this	case,	to	what	might	be	called	more	‘everyday’	pictures.	So,	for	example,	by	regarding	electrons	as	objects	and	as	individuals	and	taking	that	individuality	as	grounded	in	something	like	primitive	thisness,	we	can	relate	that	picture	to	our	understanding	(such	as	it	is)	of	all	kinds	of	objects	as	individuals	more	generally	(Chakravartty	refers	to	the	‘umbrella’	like	nature	of	metaphysics	in	this	regard).	Of	course,	some	would	argue	that	it	is	through	such	attempts	to	metaphysically	relate	quantum	entities	to	their	‘everyday’	counterparts	that	we	have	been	led	astray	in	our	endeavours	and	that	a	properly	naturalistic	approach	to	modern	physics	should	eschew	such	attempts	entirely	(Ladyman	and	Ross	2007,	Ch.	1).	However,	this	is	a	hard	line	to	take	and	would	culminate	in	a	kind	of	‘bottom	up’	approach	to	metaphysics,	effectively	demanding	that	an	appropriate	metaphysical	framework	for	quantum	physics	be	constructed	ab	initio,	something	that	is	fraught	with	problems.	Instead	we	might	adopt	a	more	moderate	approach	and	treat	metaphysics	as	a	kind	of	toolbox	from	which	we	can	appropriate	various	devices	and	techniques	for	our	own	purposes	(French	and	McKenzie	2012,	2015;	see	also	Bryant	2017),	including	that	of	providing	a	clear	picture	as	Chakravartty	suggests.	Obviously	that	takes	us	away	from	a	‘purely’	naturalistic	position	but	as	just	mentioned,	that's	problematic	anyway	and	if	we	are	going	to	leaven	our	realism	with	some	metaphysics,	it	seems	appropriate	to	acknowledge	that	we	can	do	so	along	some	kind	of	spectrum.			 Of	course,	that	doesn’t	in	itself	help	us	with	the	above	metaphysical	underdetermination,	but	within	such	a	moderate	approach	an	alternative	set	of	responses	can	be	obtained	by	appealing	to	some	further	factor	to	‘break’	the	underdetermination.		
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	 So,	let	us	first	consider	what	devices	might	be	extracted	from	the	metaphysical	‘toolbox’	and	used	to	support	the	non-individuals	package.			











we’ve	said	above).	Thus	having	a	notion	of	countability	on	hand	does	not	necessarily	provide	the	basis	for	claiming	that	the	entities	concerned	are	individuals,	understood	in	primitive	terms	or	not.			 Having	said	all	that,	appealing	to	the	device	of	primitive	individuality	does	not	undermine	my	overall	project	here.	On	the	contrary,	given	the	non-naturalistic	flavour	of	haecceity,	as	one	option,	allowing	primitive	individuality	as	a	naturalistically	more	acceptable	metaphysical	alternative	could	be	seen	as	further	enhancing	the	particles-as-individuals	package	and	thereby	strengthening	the	metaphysical	underdetermination.	Nevertheless,	whether	for	reasons	of	simplicity	or	clarity	or	even	better	naturalistic	fit	in	general	(despite	what	is	argued	in	Dorato	and	Morganti	op.	cit.)	one	might	prefer	to	ground	individuality	in	the	relevant	properties	that	are	represented	within	the	theory,	whether	formally	reconstructed	or	not.	However,	as	noted	above,	that	requires	the	Principle	of	Identity	of	Indiscernibles	which	has	been	ruled	out	in	the	quantum	context.	Fortunately,	Saunders	has	revived	a	form	of	the	Principle	by	himself	delving	into	a	kind	of	‘toolbox’	–	Quine’s	–	and	retrieving	a	notion	of	‘weak	discernibility’	that	can	be	deployed	in	the	case	of	quantum	theory	(Saunders	2006b).	 	 The	core	idea	is	that	two	individuals	can	be	said	to	be	weakly	discernible	if	they	enter	into	irreflexive	relations	of	the	form	‘…	has	different	P	from	…’,	where	P	is	some	predicate.	Since	two	fermions	in	a	singlet	state,	say,	must	possess	different	spins	(one	will	have	spin	‘up’,	the	other	spin	‘down’)	they	can	be	said	to	enter	into	such	a	relation	and	hence	are	weakly	discernible	and	can	be	regarded	as	individuals	in	this	sense.	We	can	understand	this	approach	as	offering	a	further	means	of	articulating	the	quantum	particles-as-individuals	package	but	insofar	as	the	individuality	is	grounded	not	in	some	metaphysical	notion	of	primitive	thisness	or	whatever	but	in	certain	relations	holding	between	the	particles	in	a	certain	state,	it	might	be	seen	as	more	naturalistically	acceptable	than	the	alternatives.	Furthermore,	not	only	does	this	provide	another	nice	example	of	the	deployment	of	a	metaphysical	device,	it	also	illustrates	how	such	a	device,	having	been	initially	discarded,	may	see	its	fortunes	restored,	as	it	were	–	Leibniz’s	Principle	was	rejected	as	false	in	quantum	mechanics,	only	for	Saunders	to	re-tool	it	using	this	Quinean	notion	of	‘weak	discernibility’	(for	further	discussion	of	such	moves,	see	French	and	Mckenzie	2015).		 Needless	to	say,	however,	matters	are	still	not	entirely	straightforward.	As	the	above	brief	sketch	indicates,	weak	discernibility	as	originally	presented	only	applies	to	fermions	that	can	exist	in	such	singlet	states.	Bosons,	on	the	other	hand,	do	not	enter	into	such	irreflexive	relations.	One	possible	option	is	to	draw	a	distinction	between	fermions	and	bosons	that	accommodates	this	difference	in	discernibility.	Thus	Saunders	has	suggested	that	whereas	the	former	are	‘material’	particles,	the	latter	are	force	‘carriers’	and	hence,	as	mere	field	excitations,	might	not	be	expected	to	be	discernible.	The	obvious	worry	is	that	this	seems	to	be	a	bit	of	an	ad	hoc	move.	Subsequently,	Saunders’	original	argument	was	generalized,	to	conclude	that	fermions	are	always	weakly	discernible	and	bosons	sometimes	are,	depending	on	the	state	they	happen	to	be	in	(Muller	and	Saunders	2008).		However	this	generalization	has	itself	been	criticized	on	the	grounds	that	the	operators	appealed	to	in	the	bosonic	case	are	unphysical,	and	those	in	the	case	of	fermions	are	multiples	of	the	identity,	hence	
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do	not	correspond	to	any	physical	relation	(Huggett	and	Norton	2014).	Fortunately,	again,	physically	appropriate	sets	of	observables	can	be	constructed	in	terms	of	which	it	can	be	shown	that	both	bosons	and	fermions	can	be	categorically	weakly	discerned	in	certain	states	and	probabilistically	so	in	all	(where	the	former	pertains	to	being	in	an	eigenstate	of	the	relevant	observable	and	the	latter	to	possession	of	a	given	expectation	value	of	an	observable;	ibid.).			 Nevertheless,	one	might	still	have	concerns	about	the	use	of	this	particular	tool	of	‘weak	discernibility’.	Let	us	go	back	to	the	core	idea,	exemplified	in	the	case	of	fermions	by	the	irreflexive	relation	‘…	has	different	spin	from	…’	conferring	weak	discernibility	upon	them.	A	well-known	worry	about	the	use	of	relations	to	ground	individuality	is	that	insofar	as	a	relation	is	taken	to	hold	between	two	relata,	this	move	presupposes	the	identity	of	the	latter.	The	issue	here	is	one	of	ontological	priority.	One	response	is	to	shift	that	priority	to	the	relations,	so	that	instead	of	talking	of	relations	holding	‘between’	two	relata,	already	ontologically	‘in	place’,	as	it	were,	one	conceives	of	the	latter	as	being	constituted,	in	some	sense,	out	of	the	former.	Of	course,	effecting	such	a	shift	is	precisely	what	has	been	taken	to	characterize	structuralism	in	general	(for	further	discussion,	see	French	and	Krause	2006,	pp.	175-177).	And	of	course	it	involves	the	(partial)	abandonment	of	the	object	oriented	stance,	which	is	precisely	the	response	to	the	underdetermination	to	be	discussed	below.	Whether	one	sees	this	as	a	further	cost	or	a	positive	feature	of	the	‘weak	discernibility’	approach	obviously	depends	on	one’s	sympathies	towards	the	structuralist	tendency.			 There	is,	however,	an	even	deeper	issue	here	that	has	to	do	with	the	justification	for	attributing	properties	to	quantum	systems	in	general.		Standardly,	this	attribution	is	provided	by	the	so-called	‘Eigenvalue-Eigenstate	Link’	which,	simply	put,	states	that	a	given	property	can	only	be	attributed	to	a	system	if	and	only	if	that	system	is	in	the	corresponding	eigenstate	of	the	observable	concerned.	Typically	this	is	used	to	attribute	monadic	properties,	such	as	spin,	to	systems	but	as	Muller	and	Saunders	note,	a	crucial	step	in	their	argument	for	the	claim	that	fermions	are	weakly	discernible	is	to	extend	the	Eigenvalue-Eigenstate	Link	to	relations	(Muller	and	Saunders	2008,	p.	515).	Norton,	however,	has	raised	concerns	about	this	step;	in	particular,	with	regard	to	the	attribution	of	the	irreflexive	relation	‘has	opposite	spin	to’	to	the	specific	formal	expression	used	in	Muller	and	Saunders’	argument	(Norton	2015).	He	asks	three	questions:	why	should	we	take	this	formal	expression	to	represent	any	physical	property	of	the	system	at	all?	If	we	do	so	take	it,	why	should	we	take	it	to	represent	a	dyadic	property	and	not	some	property	of	different	arity?	And	even	if	we	accept	that,	why	should	we	take	it	to	represent	a	symmetric	and	irreflexive	dyadic	property?		 As	he	goes	on	to	note,	what	needs	to	be	provided	here	is	an	extension	of	the	Eigenvalue-Eigenstate	Link	that	would	enable	us	to	move	from	the	particular	formal	expression	to	the	relevant	n-adic	property	(ibid.,	p.	1194).	Unfortunately,	Muller	and	Saunders	do	not	provide	such	an	extension,	nor	is	one	part	of	the	standard	formulation	of	quantum	mechanics.	Furthermore,	even	if	we	were	to	accept	that	such	a	move	could	be	made,	some	further	justification	would	need	to	be	given	to	interpret	that	property	as	‘has	opposite	spin	to’.	Here	things	are	unclear,	to	say	the	least,	since	the	relevant	formalism	as	it	stands	does	not	rule	out	other	interpretations	of	that	formal	expression	(ibid.,	pp.	1195-1196).	
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Interestingly,	part	of	the	justification	for	the	interpretation	in	terms	of	‘opposite	spin	to’	refers	back	to	an	earlier	argument	of	Saunders	(2003)	but	as	Norton	notes	(2015	p.	1196	fn	9)	this	in	turn	draws	on	Mermin’s	‘relationalist’	interpretation	of	quantum	mechanics	that	eschews	relata	to	begin	with	(as	noted	in	French	and	Krause	2006,	p.	175)	and	so,	in	that	case,	there	would	be	no	objects	to	be	weakly	discernible	and	the	status	of	PII	would,	again,	be	obviated!		 More	significantly,	perhaps,	Norton	claims	that	what	does	the	‘heavy	lifting’	in	the	identification	of	the	relevant	property	as	‘has	opposite	spin	to’	is	simply	the	assertion	that	each	of	the	two	particles	in	the	relevant	state	happen	to	have	opposite	values	of	spin	(ibid.,	p.	1196).	However,	as	he	goes	on	to	argue,	a	possible	circularity	arises	here	and	to	avoid	it,	we	need	to	verify	that	assertion.	Unfortunately,	given	that	the	particles	are	in	an	entangled	state,	neither	one	can	be	isolated	in	order	to	determine	its	spin.	And	granted	that	the	relevant	observable	does	pick	out	opposite	eigenvalues	in	the	case	of	the	singlet	state,	one	still	has	to	provide	grounds	for	identifying	a	given	part	of	the	relevant	expression	as	representing	which	particle.	Here	it	is	easy	to	be	misled	by	the	way	we	write	the	relevant	expression:		
ψ	=	1/√2(↑↓ -	↓↑)		Tempted	as	we	might	be	to	read	↑↓	as	‘particle	one	with	spin	up	and	particle	two	with	spin	down’,	treating	the	terms	in	this	way	as	separately	giving	information	about	the	state	is	akin	the	regarding	the	above	expression	as	describing	a	statistical	mixture,	rather	than	an	entangled	state	(ibid.,	p.	1197).	It	is	the	state	as	a	whole	that	has	physical	content,	not	what	appear	in	the	formalism	as	separate	components.	Thus,	the	above	piece	of	formalism	‘…may	tempt	us	into	thinking	that	its	pattern	of	arrows	is	revealing	hidden	relations	between	the	single	particles.’	(ibid.,	p.	1198).	However,	absent	further	justification,	such	temptations	should	be	resisted	and	hence,	Norton	concludes,	‘…there	is	nothing	in	the	singlet	state’s	description	that	warrants	attributing	opposite	spin	to	its	particles.’	(ibid.;	see	also	Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming)		 In	fact,	a	similar	concern	has	been	raised	previously,	both	in	the	context	of	an	early	consideration	of	Saunders’	argument	(French	and	Krause	2006,	pp.	174-177)	and	with	regard	to	the	debate	over	the	status	of	the	‘standard’	form	of	the	Principle	of	Identity	of	Indiscernibles;	that	is,	without	weak	discernibility	(Massimi	2001;	see	also	French	and	Krause	2006,	pp.	166-168).	It	hinges	on	the	question,	why	should	we	take	the	relevant	expression	–	such	as	the	example	above	–	whether	presented	in	a	formal	reconstruction	of	the	theory	or	in	the	form	of	the	latter	as	given	in	textbooks	and	the	like,	as	representing	two	objects	in	the	relevant	state	to	begin	with	(cf.	Norton	2015,	p.	1198)?			 Of	course	it	is	not	enough	to	say,	well	that	is	simply	how	the	expression	is	written;	that	is,	in	such	a	way	that	it	invites	interpretation	in	terms	of	two	objects	being	in	the	relevant	state.	As	Norton	has	rehearsed	and	as	sketched	above,	such	an	interpretation	is	not	straightforward	even	if	the	theory	is	taken	‘au	naturel’.	And	of	course,	more	generally,	when	we	write	down	the	appropriate	expression	for	a	collective	of	particles,	we	might	begin	by	assigning	‘particle	1’	say	to	‘state	1’,	‘particle	2’	to	‘state	2’	and	so	on	but	then,	following	Schrödinger’s	prescription,	we	apply	the	particle	permutation	operator	to	obtain	all	possible	permuted	combinations	and	then	select	out	of	those	the	symmetric	and	anti-
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symmetric	forms	(leaving	to	one	side	those	corresponding	to	parastatistics,	of	course).	In	effect	we	begin	by	assuming	the	particles	are	objects	that	can	be	labeled	and	hence	putatively	attributed	with	individuality	but	then	we	permute	these	labels	in	such	a	way	that	we	cannot	‘tell’	which	particle	is	which	so	that	the	individuality	is	either	‘lost’	or,	at	best,	‘masked’	(Post	1963).	But	what	is	the	basis	for	this	assumption	to	begin	with?		We	could	appeal,	again,	to	the	observation	of	particle	‘traces’	in	various	experimental	contexts	but	at	best	that	allows	us	to	attribute	Toraldo	di	Francia’s	‘mock’	individuality	and	as	already	noted,	we	cannot	presume	that	this	can	straightforwardly	be	exported	out	of	those	contexts	(again	see	French	and	Krause	2006,	p.	166).		 Alternatively,	we	can	acknowledge,	with	Norton,	that	weak	discernibility	cannot	be	attributed	to	the	particles	and	thus	that	there	is	simply	no	basis	for	contemplating	the	status	of	even	this	modified	form	of	Leibniz’s	Principle	in	the	quantum	domain.	Of	course,	that	still	doesn’t	necessarily	rule	out	the	particles-as-individuals	package	–	one	could	ground	their	individuality	in	haecceities	and	metaphysically	accommodate	the	entanglement	in	terms	of	some	other	device,	such	as	relations	of	‘non-supervenient’	relations	(Teller	1986;	see	also	French	1989b)	or	‘symmetric	dependence’	(Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming).19	As	noted	already,	the	extent	to	which	one	sees	such	options	as	running	counter	to	an	appropriate	form	of	naturalism	depends	on	one’s	attitude	towards	the	use	of	such	metaphysical	devices. 	 Let	us	pause	and	review.		As	we	have	seen,	both	‘packages’	can	be	elaborated	in	terms	of	a	variety	of	formal	and	metaphysical	‘devices’.	One	could	of	course	argue	that	the	deployment	of	somesuch	device	or	other	confers	a	significant	advantage	of	one	package	over	the	other	and	thereby	‘breaks’	the	underdetermination.	However,	as	we’ve	also	seen,	whatever	device	one	picks,	its	deployment	is	going	to	be	subject	to	an	array	of	caveats	and	counter-arguments	of	not	only	different	strength	–	insofar	as	that	can	be	measured	–	but	of	very	different	kinds,	with	the	result	that	comparing	them	is	not	just	a	matter	of	‘apples	vs.	oranges’	but	of	a	whole	basket	of	tropical	fruit!	So,	for	example,	for	all	that	the	notion	of	‘weak	discernibility’	can	be	subjected	to	the	above	criticisms,	it	at	least	has	the	virtue	of	being	presented	within	a	Quinean	and	hence	classical	logical	and	set-theoretical	framework;	whereas	if	you	feel	that	those	criticisms,	together	with	the	unalloyed	metaphysical	nature	of	haecceities,	compel	you	to	adopt	the	non-individuals	alternative,	you	have	to	accept	the	costs	associated	with	quasi-set	theory.	And	of	course,	none	of	these	metaphysical	moves	and	manoeuvres	will	impress	van	Fraassen	in	the	slightest!		
Back	to	the	Challenge	Returning	to	his	challenge,	then,	we	can	now	better	appreciate,	perhaps,	the	motivational	force	of	the	underdetermination	in	pushing	us	to	avoid	all	the	above	philosophical	‘to	and	fro’	and	to	drop	the	commitment	to	objects	to	begin	with.	Of	course,	shifting	to	a	structuralist	ontology	does	not	obviate	the	need	for	some	metaphysical	explication	and	the	above	‘spectrum’	running	from	‘shallow’	to	‘deeper’	forms	of	realism	can	still	be	invoked.	Indeed,	on	an	autobiographical																																																									19	Norton	suggests	that	we	might	interpret	entangled	states	as	representing	‘emergent	unities’	(2015	p.	1198)	but	it	is	not	clear	what	this	could	mean	(cf.	Howard	1989).		
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correlations	that	violate	the	famous	Bell	inequalities.	Thus	the	ontic	structural	realist	cannot	accommodate	entanglement	by	simply	folding	it	into	the	role	of	Permutation	Symmetry,	say.			 One	option	would	be	to	extend	the	relationalist	approach	hinted	at	above	from	the	fermionic	singlet	state	to	entangled	states	in	the	latter	sense.	However	this	immediately	runs	afoul	of	the	afore-mentioned	concerns	as	to	whether	the	relevant	mathematical	expression	can	even	be	taken	to	represent	a	relation	to	begin	with	(for	consideration	of	these	concerns	in	the	specific	context	of	entanglement,	see	Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming).	And	of	course,	if	such	relations	were	taken	to	underpin	‘weak	discernibility’,	understood	as	grounding	the	individuality	of	the	particles,	then	even	if	it	could	be	pulled	off,	such	a	move	would	only	work	for	so-called	‘moderate’	forms	of	ontic	structural	realism	that	still	allow	some	role	for	objects	(even	a	much	attenuated	one;	for	criticisms	see	French	2014	pp.	178-180).			 Furthermore,	even	if	the	above	concerns	are	put	aside,	and	the	relevant	expressions	are	understood	as	representing	relations,	and	it	is	acknowledged	that	this	approach	would	only	work	for	certain	forms	of	structural	realism,	there	remains	the	issue	of	accommodating	the	relationship	between	the	relevant	relation	and	the	particles,	where	the	former	yields	the	weak	discernibility	of	the	latter.	One	might	dive	into	the	metaphysicans’	toolbox	yet	again	and	appeal	to	some	form	of	dependence	here	(French	2010).	However,	insofar	as	the	relevant	states	can	be	expressed	in	terms	of	different	observables,	such	as	spin	or	position,	say,	so	that	different	relations	are	in	play,	the	form	of	dependence	will	be	only	‘generic’	in	the	sense	that	it	does	not	pick	out	which	is	the	ontologically	fundamental	relation	(McKenzie	2014a;	Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming).	Here	perhaps	the	issue	of	which	is	one’s	favoured	interpretation	intrudes	again:	the	structuralist	Bohmian	(if	there	is	such	a	beast!)	would	certainly	argue	for	position	relations	being	fundamental	(on	the	usual	grounds	that	all	measurements	are	ultimately	position	measurements)	and	construct	all	other	observables,	including	spin,	from	those.	Alternatively,	one	could	agree	that	position	is	fundamental	in	this	sense	but	decline	to	engage	in	the	Bohmian	construction,	noting	instead	that	we	can	understand	spin	as	a	determinate	of	Poincaré	symmetry.	There	is,	as	critics	have	noted,	further	work	to	be	done	(Calosi	and	Morganti	ibid.).		 Another	device	might	be	that	of	non-supervenience,	already	mentioned	above	and	originally	introduced	precisely	to	offer	a	new	metaphysical	understanding	of	entanglement	within	a	broadly	relationalist	framework	(Teller	1986).	Indeed,	this	was	cited	in	Ladyman’s	classic	work	on	ontic	structural	realism	(Ladyman	1998)	as	a	further	motivation	for	shifting	to	a	structuralist	stance.	Again,	however,	this	seems	best	suited	to	the	‘moderate’	forms	insofar	as	‘non-supervenience’	is	cashed	out,	negatively,	in	terms	of	the	relevant	relations	not	supervening	(surprise	surprise!)	on	the	intrinsic	or	other	properties	of	the	particles;	indeed,	as	also	already	noted,	it	has	been	taken	to	mesh	nicely	with	the	particles-as-individuals	package	(French	1989b).			 Presumably	non-supervenience	in	this	case	would	also	be	dismissed	as	‘generic’	but	one	could	make	the	same	sort	of	move	as	above	and	obtain	the	different	kinds	of	non-supervenient	relations	by	appealing	to,	for	example,	the	way	certain	properties	‘drop	out’	of	the	relevant	symmetry.	This	move	perhaps	offers	one	way	of	meeting	the	challenge	that	‘…	we	need	to	be	told	what	exactly	
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the	physical	content	of	the	relevant	relations	is,	which	observables	the	correlated	quantum	objects	depend	on.’	(Calosi	and	Morganti	forthcoming).	Nevertheless,	if	one	is	uncomfortable	with	such	metaphysical	devices,	one	might	simply	take	the	structure	of	the	world	to	be	represented,	in	part,	by	Hilbert	space,	as	again	alluded	to	in	Ladyman’s	original	piece	(1998).25	So,	we	recall	that	the	standard	way	of	representing	the	states	of	systems	is	in	terms	of	the	tensor	product	Hilbert	space.	The	action	of	Permutation	Symmetry	then	divides	that	space	into	different	‘symmetrised’	sectors	–	with	two	particles,	only	two	sectors	are	possible,	namely	the	antisymmetric	and	symmetric,	corresponding	to	fermions	and	bosons	respectively	of	course	but	for	three	or	more	particles	other	sectors	become	available,	corresponding	to	paraparticles	which,	as	already	mentioned,	do	not	appear	to	exist	in	this	world.	The	fermionic	singlet	state	underpinning	the	attribution	of	weak	discernibility	has	the	characteristics	that	it	does	by	virtue	of	falling	within	the	anti-symmetric	sector.			 This	still	does	not	accommodate	the	empirically	more	interesting	form	of	entanglement	but	again,	what	the	structuralist	says	on	this	may	depend	on	certain	other	interpretational	moves.	So,	for	example,	for	Hilbert	spaces	of	dimension	greater	than	three,	the	Kochen-Specker	theorem	holds,	which	means	that,	putting	things	negatively,	the	structure	of	the	world	is	such	that	it	is	impossible	to	assign	values	to	all	physical	quantities	whilst,	at	the	same	time,	preserving	the	functional	relations	between	them	(Isham	and	Butterfield	1998).	In	effect,	the	theorem	requires	any	no-hidden-variables	interpretation	of	quantum	theory	to	be	contextual.	Likewise,	one	can	understand	Bell’s	Theorem	as	ruling	out	any	local	hidden	variables	theory	and	given	that	this	has	been	described	as	‘the	most	profound	discovery	in	science’	(Stapp	1975,	p.	271),	the	structuralist	might	be	justified	in	taking	it	to	represent	a	fundamental	feature	of	the	structure	of	the	world.	Characterising	that	feature	more	positively	however	bumps	up	against	the	afore-mentioned	interpretational	attitudes,	as	an	Everettian	will	have	a	very	different	view	of	what	the	theorem	tells	us	than	the	Bohmian,	say.	All	of	this	is	to	acknowledge	that	there	is	indeed	more	work	to	be	done	(again	see	Calosi	and	Morganti)	but	in	fairness,	insofar	as	it	involves	such	attitudes,	it	is	work	that	the	non-structuralist	has	to	do	as	well!		 		
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